Firm Expansion and CEO Pay by Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We are grateful to Arturo Bris, John Core, Cliff Holderness, Lu Zhang, and participants in workshops at
Harvard University, University of Rochester, and the NBER for helpful comments and discussions. For
financial support, we would like to thank the Guggenheim Foundation, the Nathan Cummins Foundation,
the Lens Foundation for Corporate Excellence, and the Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics,
and Business. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.Firm Expansion and CEO Pay
Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein
NBER Working Paper No. 11886
December 2005
JEL No. D23, G32, G38, J33, J44, K22, M14
ABSTRACT
We study the extent to which decisions to expand firm size are associated with increases in
subsequent  CEO  compensation.  Controlling  for  past  stock  performance,  we  find  a  positive
correlation between CEO compensation and the CEO's past decisions to increase firm size. This
correlation is economically meaningful; for example, other things being equal, CEOs who in the
preceding three years were in the top quartile in terms of expanding by increasing the number of
shares outstanding receive compensation that is higher by one-third than the compensation of CEOs
belonging to the bottom quartile. We also find that stock returns are correlated with subsequent CEO
pay only to the extent that they contribute to expanding firm size; only the component of past stock
returns not distributed as dividends is correlated with subsequent CEO pay. Finally, we find an
asymmetry between increases and decreases in size: while increases in firm size are followed by
higher CEO pay, decreases in firm size are not followed by reduction in such pay. The association
we find between CEOs' compensation and firm-expanding decisions undertaken earlier during their












  A long-standing view in economics and finance holds that managers have an excessive 
incentive to expand the size of their firm, (e.g., Baumol (1959), Jensen (1986), Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)). On this view, managers could choose to make some value-
decreasing acquisitions, as well as to retain excessive cash flow instead of distributing it to 
shareholders. Managers might act in this way because increasing firm size could serve their 
private interests in various ways. Among other things, Jensen (1986) suggests that expanding 
firm size might benefit managers by enabling them to obtain larger executive pay.  
  The view that firm expansion might be rewarded by higher executive pay relies in part on 
the observation that pay and firm size appear to be correlated. As many studies document (see, 
e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), and Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002))—and as any 
casual look at compensation tables published by the financial press suggests—larger firms tend 
to provide their CEOs with larger pay packages. However, upon reflection, the correlation 
between firm size and CEO pay does not establish that CEOs could increase the size of their 
pay package by expanding firm size or that CEO pay is correlated with the CEO’s own choices 
whether (and to what extent) to expand firm size.  
  For example, suppose that the compensation of continuing CEOs at any given year is a 
function only of (i) the size of the firm when the executive started serving as a CEO (say, 
because firms with a larger size seek to attract more talented executives), and (ii) the stock 
performance of the company during the CEO’s service thus far. If boards act in this way, 
expanding the size of the firm will by itself (i.e., putting aside any effect it might have on stock 
returns) have no effect on the CEO’s subsequent compensation. In such a case, however, we 
will still observe a correlation between CEOs’ current compensation and the size of their firms 
because the size of a continuing CEO’s firm is likely to be correlated both with the firm’s size 
when the CEO began serving and with the stock performance during the CEO’s service. Thus, 
to identify whether the prospect of higher subsequent pay could provide CEOs with incentives 
to expand firm size, we need to investigate whether past CEO decisions to expand are followed 
by a compensation increase beyond the increase due to improved performance associated with 
these expansions (if any). We pursue such an investigation in this study. 
  We find that a CEO’s compensation is correlated with the firm’s stock performance during 
the preceding years of the CEO’s service. We also find, however, that, controlling for such past 
performance, a CEO’s compensation, as well as the change in the CEO’s compensation from  2
earlier levels, is correlated with increases in the firm’s size — in terms of either assets or sales 
— during the preceding years of the CEO’s service.  
  We further investigate the association between pay and size-expansion decisions by 
decomposing changes in firm size into two components: increases in shares outstanding and 
increases in size (whether measured by assets or sales) per share. We find that, other things 
being equal, a CEO’s current pay is correlated with the rate of growth in the number of shares 
outstanding during the CEO’s preceding service. This rate of share growth is the product of (i) 
issuance of shares to finance acquisitions, (ii) issuance of shares to finance investments and 
internal expansion, (iii) issuances of shares to finance compensation to employees (in lieu of 
paying them in cash, which reduces firm size), and (iv) decisions whether to repurchase shares 
(which operate to reduce firm size and share growth). By increasing the number of shares 
outstanding, a CEO can increase firm size without necessarily increasing shareholder returns. 
The identified correlation between CEO pay and preceding growth of shares outstanding is 
economically meaningful: Holding all else constant, the average compensation in firms that 
belong to the top quartile in terms of change in shares outstanding in the preceding three years 
is higher by about one-third than the average compensation given to the bottom quartile. 
  We also find that, other things being equal (including past stock returns), a CEO’s pay is 
correlated with the increase in assets per share and sales per share during the CEO’s preceding 
service. This association is also economically meaningful. Holding all else constant, the 
average compensation in firms that belong to the top quartile in terms of increasing per share 
sales during the preceding three years is higher by about one-fifth than the average 
compensation given to the bottom quartile. Similarly, holding all else constant, the average 
compensation in firms that belong to the top quartile in terms of increasing per share assets 
during the preceding three years is higher by about one-fourth than the average compensation 
given to the bottom quartile. Because strategies that would maximize per share sales or per 
share assets might differ from ones that would maximize stockholder returns, these finding are 
also relevant for assessing executives’ incentives.  
  We also decompose past stock returns under a continuing CEO into the capital gain 
component—that is, the part of the return not paid out as dividends—and the dividend 
component. We find that a CEO’s compensation is correlated with the capital gain component 
of the stock returns under the CEO’s preceding service, but we do not find such correlation for 
the dividend component. Because the dividend component of total stock returns does not 
contribute to firm size (even though it does contribute to shareholder wealth), this finding is  3
consistent with the general positive correlation we find between firm-expanding decisions and 
higher subsequent pay. 
  Our analysis of the expansion-compensation correlation also identifies an asymmetry 
between increases and decreases in firm size.
1 The positive correlation between compensation 
and size is driven by firms that increase firm size and not by firms that decrease firm size. 
There is correlation between size changes and compensation among CEOs who increase firm 
size but not among CEOs who decrease firm size.  
We should stress that CEOs’ firm-expansion decisions are influenced not only by 
expectations that expansion will be followed by higher subsequent pay but also by the 
expected effect that expansion decisions will have on the value of options and shares given to 
the CEOs earlier as part of their compensation packages. Other things being equal, such 
holdings of shares and options operate to align CEOs’ incentives with those of the 
shareholders. Indeed, there is evidence that CEOs with larger holdings of shares and options 
are less likely to make value-decreasing acquisition decisions (see, e.g., Amihud and Lev 
(1981), Lewellen and Loderer (1984)). However, as we shall discuss in the next section, for 
any given level of managerial holdings of shares and options, CEOs’ decisions will be 
distorted in the direction of excessive size expansion if expansion can be expected to produce 
higher subsequent pay. 
  We should also emphasize that our findings of correlation between firm expansion and 
subsequent pay does not indicate that current compensation practices are suboptimal. To be 
sure, such correlation might be the result of boards’ use of benchmarking by size that 
compensation consultants recommend (Hall and Murphy (2003), Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). 
However, such correlation could also result from arm’s length contracting between boards and 
managers. For example, a larger firm size might make it desirable to provide the CEO with 
more powerful incentives (Baker and Hall (2004)), and it also might strengthen the manager’s 
bargaining position by increasing the cost to the company of replacing the manager or by 
providing the manager with experience that enhances the value of outside opportunities. Thus, 
even though a connection between firm expansion and subsequent pay might distort managers’ 
ex ante choices, having such a connection might be necessary or optimal overall.   
  While our results do not necessarily indicate that current compensation patterns are 
suboptimal, they validate the concern expressed by Jensen (1986) and others that compensation 
                                                 
1 Our analysis of this issue is in the spirit of Garvey and Milbourn (2005), who study whether pay 
responds differently to positive and negative changes in stock returns.  4
practices provide managers with incentives to expand firm size. Recognition and study of these 
incentives are important for understanding firms’ decisions to issue shares, make acquisitions 
and investments, and distribute cash through cash dividends and repurchases.  
  Finally, it should be noted that managers’ expansion decisions might be influenced by 
factors other than the effect of these decisions on the managers’ current holdings of shares and 
options and their subsequent compensation. A distortion in favor of expansion produced by 
compensation practices could be strengthened by expectations that expansion would increase 
managers’ power and prestige or make a takeover less likely. A distortion in favor of 
expansion, however, might also be mitigated by the presence of large block-holders and 
vigilant boards (which might lead to the firing of underperforming CEOs), by career concerns, 
by the market for corporate control, by the larger effort levels required to manage larger firms, 
or by other factors that might operate to discourage managers from producing low returns for 
shareholders (see, e.g., Benston (1985), Rosen (1992)). Thus, assessing whether and to what 
extent firm-expansion decisions are rewarded by compensation practices – our aim in this 
paper – is necessary but not sufficient for a full understanding of managers’ private incentives 
with respect to firm expansion.  
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the question we 
seek to investigate and the prior empirical work on the subject. Section III presents our 
empirical analysis. Section IV concludes.  
 
2. Research questions and Prior work 
2.1. Jensen’s conjecture   
A good statement of the conjecture we seek to study can be found in Jensen (1986). Jensen 
argues that “managers have incentive to cause their firms to grow beyond the optimal size.” 
Some of these incentives, Jensen suggests, arise from the fact that growth is “associated with 
increases in managers’ compensation.”  
The concern about CEOs’ incentives arises from the plausible assumption that CEOs can 
have considerable influence on changes in firm size. While some relevant decisions (e.g., 
decisions to make acquisitions or distributions) are made by the board, CEOs wield 
considerable influence on whether the issue will reach the board and on the board’s decision. 
CEOs are likely to have information that directors do not have, and they are often the ones that  5
initiate firm-expansion decisions and make proposals and recommendations to the board. 
Which decisions concerning firm size would be value-maximizing is not observable and, thus 
commonly, cannot be decided by the board (or directly by shareholders) without any input 
from the firm’s top executives. As a result, CEOs can influence the firm-expansion decisions 
that their firms make, and this influence in turn is shaped by their private incentives. 
Compensation practices affect CEOs’ payoffs from decisions concerning firm size in two 
ways. First, compensation arrangements provide CEOs with options and shares, and CEOs will 
likely take into account the effect of their decisions on the value of the portfolio of shares and 
options they hold as a result of prior compensation decisions. Second, CEOs might well take 
into account how their decisions will affect the value of (both cash and equity-based) 
compensation that they can expect to receive later on.  
There are several reasons why CEOs might expect an increasing firm size to lead to 
increased compensation in subsequent periods. Even assuming that the board is solely focused 
on shareholder interests and engages in arm’s-length contracting with the CEO, a larger firm 
size might lead the board to grant higher pay. An increased firm size might make it desirable to 
provide the CEO with more powerful incentives; might provide the manager with experience, 
visibility, and connections that could enhance the CEO’s outside options; and might strengthen 
the CEO’s bargaining position also by raising the costs of replacing the CEO with a new one. 
In addition, because a board might seek to maintain some parity with compensation in peer 
companies to avoid morale and prestige issues, a larger firm size could lead to the CEO’s 
compensation being compared to that in larger companies with higher pay.  
From the shareholders’ perspective, the only relevant question is how a given firm-
expansion decision will affect returns. From the manager’s private perspective, however, both 
return and size matter, which means that the manager’s decision would be distorted in favor of 
firm expansion. As long as the CEO can expect an increase in the firm size to increase the 
CEO’s subsequent compensation, this expectation would introduce a distortion, on the margin, 
in favor of such a size expansion. The CEO’s current holdings of shares and options could 
mitigate the magnitude of this distortion but not eliminate it. 
To illustrate, consider a CEO who serves for two periods and is expected to receive in the 
beginning of each period 1% of the firm’s shares. And suppose that during the first period, the 
CEO faces an opportunity to make a stock-financed acquisition that would double the 
company’s number of shares and would change returns to existing shareholders by x%. In this 
situation, if x is negative, the CEO will take into account both (i) that the acquisition will  6
reduce the value of the shares the CEO received in the beginning of the first period, and (ii) 
that the acquisition will double the number of shares that the CEO will receive in the beginning 
of the second period. Clearly, there is a range of negative values that x might take for which 
the CEO will still be better off making the acquisition.   
To see the point more generally, consider a CEO who holds a fraction α of a company’s 
shares as a result of earlier compensation decisions. Suppose that, without any firm-expansion 
decisions, the market value of the company’s shares at the end of the current period will be W0, 
and the value of the CEO’s position will thus be αW0.  The CEO now faces an opportunity to 
take an action that would increase (some measure of) firm size by γ and will increase the return 
to the existing shareholders by ρ.  
Suppose also that the compensation to the CEO,  ) , ( γ ρ C , is an increasing function of both 
the return ρ and the size expansion γ.. In this case, the CEO will decide to expand size if and 
only if:  C(ρ, γ) + α W0 ρ >0. As long as ∂ C / ∂ γ > 0, the threshold ρ* over which the CEO 
will make the acquisition will be negative. The intuition is that the CEO will be making a 
positive profit even for a firm-expansion action that breaks even for the existing shareholders 
(ρ=0). With ρ=0, the CEO will neither gain nor lose on the CEO’s existing shares but will gain 
from obtaining a higher compensation in the next period. Thus, the threshold ρ* at which the 
CEO breaks even from an expansion decision must be negative. Note that the larger α is, the 
weaker the distortion. As long as the expansion will bring about a higher next-period pay (i.e., 
∂ C / ∂ γ > 0), however, there will be a distortion in favor of expansion. This association 
makes it important to find out whether, under current pay practices, CEOs can expect that, 
controlling for stock return performance, expansion will be followed by a pay increase.  
The fact that an association between firm expansion and subsequent compensation might 
distort firm-expansion decisions does in no way imply that such a connection, if it exists, is a 
part of suboptimal pay practices. Ex post, i.e., after the expansion decision was made, it might 
be efficient for pay setting to be characterized by ∂ C / ∂ γ > 0. Thus, optimal setting of pay 
policy might involve a tradeoff between the ex post benefits of increasing pay when size 
increases and the ex ante costs that such a connection might have in terms of distorting earlier 
firm-expansion decisions. Thus, finding a correlation between compensation and earlier firm-
expansion decisions under the CEO does not imply that existing compensation practices are 
suboptimal. But it does indicate that these practices produce incentives to expand that boards  7
should recognize, and that researchers studying firm acquisition, investment, and distribution 
decisions should take into account.  
Finally, it should be noted that, while we focus on identifying whether compensation 
practices provide incentives to expand firm size, such incentives may be reinforced or 
countervailed by other factors. Expansion decisions might affect the CEO’s utility in ways 
other than through their effect on the CEO’s compensation. A larger firm size might affect the 
CEO’s utility directly both positively (by enhancing the CEO’s prestige, power, perquisites, 
etc.) and negatively (by increasing the effort the CEO will have to exert or the pressures to 
which the CEO will be subject). In addition, firm expansion, and the effect that it will have on 
returns, will affect the likelihood that the CEO will be able to remain in office as well as the 
subsequent career opportunities that the CEO will have.  
 
2.2. Prior empirical work 
 
  There is a large body of empirical literature on CEO compensation (see Murphy (1999), 
and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2003) for excellent surveys). In existing studies, researchers 
seeking to explain current CEO compensation often include current firm size as well as past 
stock return performance in their regressions. The general findings in the literature are that 
CEO pay is correlated with current firm size and with the firm’s stock performance in 
preceding years (see, e.g., Murphy (1985, 1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hubbard and 
Palia (1995), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Cyert. Kang, and Kumar (2002)). Our 
analysis also finds, unsurprisingly, that compensation is correlated with past stock returns. We 
seek to contribute, however, by adding as independent variables other changes in the firm 
during the preceding years of the CEO’s service, including the rate of growth of shares 
outstanding, the growth in per share assets and per share sales, and dividend decisions.  
There has also been some significant empirical work on the connection between 
compensation and decisions to make acquisitions, which are an important type of firm-
expansion decisions. Several papers study how acquisition decisions are influenced by 
managers’ holdings of shares and options at the time of the acquisition decision (Agrawal and 
Mendelker (1987), Bliss and Rosen (2001), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001)). More 
closely related to our work are several papers that focus on how acquisition decisions affect 
subsequent executive pay. Bliss and Rosen (2001), Grinstein and Hribar (2004), and Harford  8
and Li (2005) find that acquisitions have a positive effect on subsequent pay, but Avery, 
Chevalier, and Schaefer(1998) do not find such an effect.  
We complement the above studies of the association between acquisitions and subsequent 
pay by looking at a broader set of expansion decisions and strategies. While these studies focus 
on firms that make large acquisitions, some firms grow substantially through a series of small 
or medium acquisitions rather than one large acquisition. Furthermore, acquisition decisions 
are not the only decisions made by CEOs that have an effect on firm size. Executives can also 
increase firm size by raising equity to finance internal expansion, avoiding dividends and share 
buybacks, making operating decisions that would increase sales or assets without necessarily 
contributing to profits, and so on and so forth. Our strategy is to focus on the correlation 
between a CEO’s compensation and the whole universe of the CEO’s expanding decisions 
during a period of the past two to four years.  
Finally, it is worth noting the significant literature that documents the tendency of 
managers to make some size-increasing decisions that are not value-enhancing. For example, 
there is a significant body of empirical work suggesting that managers sometimes elect to 
make acquisition decisions that appear to be value-reducing, (see, e.g., Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Qui (2004),  Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz (2005), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2005)). Our work complements this line of 
work by investigating the private benefits that might provide managers with incentives to make 
such firm-expansion decisions.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. The Data 
 
Our primary data source is the Execucomp database. We use information about CEO 
compensation in public U.S. companies from 1993 onwards. The database includes all of the 
S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and Small-Cap 600 companies, as well as companies that once 
belonged to these indexes. Together, these firms constitute more than 80% of the total market 
capitalization of U.S. public firms. We obtain financial information about firms in our sample 
from the Compustat database and the CRSP database.  
Our strategy is to study the relation between the compensation of CEOs and their prior 
performance and firm-expansion decisions. We therefore include in our analysis of  9
compensation in any given year only “continuing” CEOs who have been in the Execucomp 
database and served in their position for a given period of time. We initially look at 
performance and firm expansion in the preceding three years, and therefore focus on the set of 
CEOs who already served for three or more years. For robustness, we later perform a similar 
analysis for different time windows, looking at the past two-year record of CEOs with two or 
more years of experience and the past four-year record of CEOs with four or more years of 
experience, and we obtain similar results.  
We focus on CEO compensation during the years 1997-2002. Throughout the study we 
divide our sample into six subsets of data, one for every year, and perform the cross-sectional 
analysis separately on each of these subsets. We do not use pooled regressions in order to 
avoid the potential correlations in errors in panel-data studies with repeated observations. To 
adjust for inflation, we translate throughout all monetary figures to 2002 dollars.   
Table 1 displays summary statistics of the characteristics of the firms in which CEOs 
served during the preceding three years.  
We define throughout our analysis annual CEO compensation as the TDC1 variable in the 
Execucomp database, which is the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, 
total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and 
other compensation. Median annual compensation is $2.36 million in 1997 and $3.04 million 
in 2002, and it peaks at $3.26 million in 2000.  
Market capitalization is defined as the price per share multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding (in millions) at the end of the calendar year. Median market capitalization in our 
annual subsets ranges between $1.83 billion in 1997 and $1.13 billion in 2002. Sales are the 
net sales of the firm at the end of the year (Compustat item #12). Median sales in our annual 
subsets range between $1.4 billion in 1997 and $1.13 billion in 2002.  
 The stock return variable is the total stock return, with dividend, net of inflation. The 
returns are calculated from the end of calendar year t-3 to the end of calendar year t. The 
median three-year return of firms in our sample is 66% in 1997, and drops to 4% in 2002.  
The growth in shares outstanding variables is defined as the three-year net percentage 
increase in shares outstanding, adjusted for stock splits. This variable captures changes in the 
size of existing assets due to managerial decisions to make equity-financed acquisition or 
investments, to pay employees with options and shares in lieu of cash compensation, and to 
avoid share repurchases. The percentage of firms that had a positive growth of shares 
outstanding in the preceding three years ranges between 52%-63% in our annual subsets.   10
Since the distribution of change-in-size variables is important to our analysis, we report the 
bottom quartile, median, and top quartile values for these variables. The threshold of growth of 
shares outstanding that defines the top quartile ranges between 14% and 20% in our annual 
subsets. The threshold that defines the bottom quartile ranges from -6% to -2%. The three-year 
growth in sales per share that defines the top quartile ranges between 14% and 39%, and the 
growth that defines the bottom quartile ranges between -4% to -6%. There is also substantial 
variability in growth in asset per share. The growth that defines the top quartile ranges between 
39%-61%, and the growth that defines the bottom quartile ranges between -8% and -7%.   
 
3.2. Pay and firm size 
 
Our starting point is the correlation documented in the literature between CEO 
compensation and firm size. We therefore start by establishing the relation between 
compensation and firm size in our sample. To this end, we regress log (CEO compensation) on 
the firm’s log market capitalization and log sales. (We will use log assets as another size 
variable in the regressions of Section 3.7.) 
We include in the regression, as well as in subsequent regressions, several control 
variables. We include industry dummies, following the classification of 48 industries 
introduced by Fama and French (1997). We also include a New Economy dummy, using the 
classification of Murphy (2003), to account for growth opportunities specific to internet and 
computer-related firms.  
Smith and Watts (1992) show that growth opportunities are positively related to CEO 
compensation. To control for growth opportunities, we include industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as 
an independent variable. We use industry adjustment here because our regressions already 
include industry dummies. We define industry-adjusted Q as log(Q) of the firm at the end of 
the compensation year minus the median log(Q) in the firm’s industry at that time. We define 
Q as the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, 
all divided by the book value of assets. To control for firms’ risk, we also include the standard 
deviation of the firm’s return, which we estimate over the preceding four years. The regression 
we run is as follows:  
  11
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Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates of regression (1) for each of the years 1997-2002. 
As Table 2 indicates, compensation is positively correlated with each of the two measures of 
firm size we use in each and every year. The coefficient of Log (Market Capitalization) ranges 
between 0.29 and 0.32 and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all years. The 
coefficient of Log(Sales) is also positive, ranging between 0.18 and 0.30, and is significant in 
all years (and at the 1% level in five out of the six years). Consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002), and Core, Guay, and Larcker (1999)), the return 
variability coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level throughout. The New 
Economy dummy is positive and significant in most of the years.  
3.3. Pay and changes in firm size under the CEO 
 
Our first step in the analysis of the relation between compensation and firm size is to take 
into account the fact that firm size is not an exogenous variable but rather is partly a product of 
the CEO’s decisions during the preceding years. Recognizing this fact, we decompose market 
capitalization and sales in year t as follows:  
 
MarketCap(t)=MarketCap(t-3)*MarketCapGrowth(t-3 to t) 
Sales(t)=Sales(t-3)*SalesGrowth(t-3 to t) 
 
  We apply this decomposition to regression (1) to get the following regression:    
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Table 3 displays the results of regression (2). The results indicate that compensation levels 
are correlated with past increases in market capitalization and sales. The coefficient of the 
increase in market capitalization during the preceding three years is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in each of the annual regressions. The coefficient of the increase in  12
sales during the preceding three years is also positive in all six regressions, and it is significant 
at the 1% level in four of them and at the 5% level in the other two.  
 
3.4. Pay, past returns, and growth in shares outstanding 
 
We saw in the preceding section that current compensation is correlated with past increases 
in market capitalization and sales. This finding, however, could be fully driven by a correlation 
between compensation and past stock returns. Past increases in market capitalization might be 
fully driven by increases in the firm’s stock prices, and past increases in sales might be 
correlated with past stock returns. Thus, the above results do not indicate that increases in firm 
size are correlated with subsequent pay other than through their effects on stockholder returns.  
In our next regression we therefore replace the growth of market cap from t-3 to t with two 
variables: the stock market return from t-3 to t, and the rate of growth of shares outstanding 
from t-3 to t. The stock return represents how much shareholder wealth has appreciated, and it 
is the primary variable that the literature has used as a measure of past performance. Other than 
by increasing stock returns, however, executives can increase the firm’s market capitalization 
by increasing the number of shares outstanding. By issuing additional shares at the current 
market price, executives can increase the firm’s capital and equity capitalization without 
increasing the stock price.   
As Fama and French (2005) document, firms change the number of shares outstanding in 
connection with several main types of transactions/events. First, firms make stock-financed 
acquisitions. Second, firms raise capital through secondary equity offerings, private placements 
of equity, and rights offerings. Third, by paying employees (and sometimes creditors) with 
equity rather than cash, firms are able to retain cash they would otherwise have to expend. 
Finally, firms also sometimes take steps, such as share repurchases, that reduce the number of 
shares outstanding.  
Since we are interested in the aggregate effect of executives’ firm-expansion decisions, we 
use in our regression the net growth in shares outstanding (from all sources). In our sample, the 
number of firms with net share issuances in the previous three years ranges between 52% and 
63%. As a comparison, Fama and French (2005), report that 66.5% of firms that are larger in 
assets than the median New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firm have a positive annual growth 
in shares outstanding between the years 1993-2002.  13
Given the inclusion of the growth of shares outstanding in the regression, and the potential 
correlation between increase in shares outstanding and increase in sales, we decomposed the 
increase in sales into the growth in shares outstanding component and the growth in per share 
sales, and we therefore include the latter in the regression alongside the former. With these 
substitutions, we run the following regression:  
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The results of the estimation of regression (3) appear in Table 4. Consistent with the results 
in the literature, compensation is correlated with three-year stock returns. The result is 
significant at the 5% level or better in each of the annual regressions. But the correlation of 
current compensation with past changes goes beyond the relationship of current compensation 
with past stock returns. The coefficient of the growth in shares outstanding is positive and 
significant at the 1% level in each of the regressions. Clearly, transactions involving an 
increase in the number of shares (e.g., making a stock-financed acquisition) are not necessarily 
value-increasing. Thus, the association between increases in shares outstanding and higher 
subsequent pay is of interest.  
In addition, the coefficient of growth in sales per share is positive in all regressions, 
significant at the 5% level or better, in four out of the six regressions. Note that firms can 
expand per share sales without increasing stock returns (say, by increasing sales at prices that 
do not contribute to increasing profits). Furthermore, when two strategies to increase per share 
sales could both contribute to increasing stock returns, the strategy that increases per share 
sales the most might not be the one that would increase returns the most. Thus, the finding that, 
controlling for returns, increase in per share sales are correlated with higher subsequent pay is 
of interest.  
The log-log specification implies that the coefficients of the independent variables in Table 
4 represent the elasticity of compensation to each of the variables—that is, the percentage 
increase in CEO compensation for a 1% change in the independent variable. A one-percent 
growth in shares outstanding is associated, controlling for past returns, with 0.56%-0.97% 
increase in compensation (depending on the year examined). A one-percent growth in sales per  14
share is associated, controlling for past returns, with 0.16%-0.43% increase in compensation 
(depending on the year examined).  
Of course, how much economic significance these two size-expansion variables have 
depends on their variability. To get a sense of this economic significance, we reran the 
regression (3) replacing the growth in share outstanding variable with three dummy variables 
for whether the firm is in the second, third, or fourth quartile in the yearly subsamples in terms 
of their three-year net growth in shares. In this regression, the coefficient of the top quartile 
represents the increase in compensation, controlling for past returns, associated with a CEO’s 
being in the top quarter in terms of net share issuance rather than in the bottom quarter.  The 
estimated coefficient of the top quartile in these regressions ranges between 47% (in 1998) and 
29% (in 2001), with an average of 38%. Thus, the association between compensation and net 
share issuance is economically meaningful.  
We similarly also reran regression (3) replacing the growth in per-share sales with three 
dummy variables for whether the firm is in the second, third, or fourth quartile in the yearly  
subsamples in terms of growth in sales-per-share. The estimated coefficient of the top quartile 
in these regressions ranges between 7% (in 1997) and 35% (in 2001), with an average of 22%. 
Therefore, controlling for past stock returns, increases in sales per share also have an 
economically meaningful effect on compensation. 
 
3.5. Changes in compensation 
 
  In the level regressions we have used thus far, we controlled for differences among firms in 
past returns, initial size, industry classification, investment opportunities, and return variability. 
However, there remains the possibility that our results concerning the correlation of 
compensation with growth in shares outstanding and in sales per share are driven by an omitted 
variable that is correlated with one or both of these variables. While such a possibility is 
commonly difficult to rule out completely, we seek to explore it by comparing current 
compensation in a given firm to earlier compensation level in that same firm rather than only 
to current compensation levels in other firms.  
In particular, we rerun regression 3, but use compensation growth over the past three 
years—rather than the compensation level—as the dependent variable. We also decompose the 
independent variables industry-adjusted Q and return variability into their levels three years  15
earlier and the changes in these variables over the following three years. We present the results 
in Table 5. 
As one can expect, the adjusted R-square in the change-in-compensation regressions 
displayed in Table 5 is considerably smaller than the one in the compensation level 
regressions. However, the association between compensation changes and our main variables 
of interest is similar to the association that we found earlier between compensation levels and 
these variables. The coefficient of the growth in shares outstanding is positive in all regressions 
and significant at the 1% level in five out of the six regressions. The coefficient of the growth 
in sales per share is positive and significant in four out of the six regressions. Thus, these 
results reinforce the results of the preceding sections that firm-expansion decisions are 
correlated with increases in subsequent compensation.  
3.6. Different Windows  
We have thus far focused on the correlation between compensation in a given year and 
three-year changes in firm variables under the CEO’s management, and we have therefore 
focused in each year on the set of CEOs who have served in this position in the preceding three 
years. Since the choice of a three-year period is an ad hoc one, we reran our regressions once 
focusing on changes in the preceding two years (and using the set of all CEOs who have served 
in their position during this period) and once focusing on changes in the preceding four years 
(and using here all CEOs with four or more years of preceding service in this position).  
Table 6 shows the coefficients of the two main variables of interest—the growth in shares 
outstanding and the growth in sales-per-share—for each one of the annual level regressions 
and change-in-level regressions specified in sections D and E for the two-year and four-year 
intervals. Table 6, panel A displays the coefficients of these variables for the two-year interval. 
The coefficient of the growth in shares outstanding is positive in all the regressions and is 
significant at the 5% level or better in all the compensation-level regressions and in four out of 
the six change-in-compensation regressions. The coefficient of the growth in sales per share 
variable is positive in all the regressions and is significant at the 5% level or better in a 
substantial number of them.  
Table 6, panel B displays the coefficients of growth in shares outstanding and growth in 
sales-per-share for the four-year interval. The coefficient of the growth in shares outstanding is  16
positive and significant at the 5% level or better in all of them. The coefficient of the growth in 
sales-per-share is positive in all the regressions and is significant in four of them.  
These results are consistent with the results obtained earlier in the regressions focusing on 
compensation levels and changes-in-levels in the preceding three years. 
 
3.7. Growth in Assets  
 
Jensen (1986) argues that compensation is correlated with firm size but does not specify 
which measure of firm size should be correlated with managerial compensation. We have thus 
far focused on two measures of size — market capitalization and sales. A third measure of firm 
size that is used in the literature is firms’ book value of assets. We therefore run the regressions 
in sections D, E, and F using the book value of assets instead of sales. Consistent with our 
methodology, we decompose the growth in firm assets into growth in assets-per-share and 
growth in shares outstanding and include the former in the regressions along with the latter.  
Table 7 presents the coefficients of growth of assets per share and growth in shares 
outstanding for all the regressions we performed. Panel A of this table presents the results of 
the regressions using two-year intervals, Panel B presents the results for three-year intervals, 
and Panel C presents the results for four-year intervals.  
Consistent with our previous results, the coefficient of growth in shares outstanding 
remains positive and significant in almost all the regressions. We also find that growth in 
assets-per-share is positive in almost all the regressions and significant in the majority of them. 
Thus, our finding of a correlation between compensation and increases in size per share is 
robust to using assets rather than sales as the measure of firm size. 
We also reran the level regressions, replacing the growth in per-share assets with three 
dummy variables for whether the firm is in the second, third, or fourth quartile in terms of 
growth in assets-per-share in the yearly sub-samples. The estimated coefficient of the top 
quartile in these regressions ranges between 7% (in 1997) and 42% (in 1999), with an average 
of 27%. Thus, controlling for past stock returns, increases in assets per share also have an 
economically meaningful association with compensation. 
Because a firm can add assets that would not add to profitability (and might even reduce 
it), a strategy that would maximize growth of assets per share would, of course, not necessarily 
maximize stockholders’ returns. Thus, as with our finding concerning the correlation between  17
compensation and growth in sales-per-share, the finding that compensation is correlated with 
growth in assets per share during the CEO’s service is of interest.  
 
3.8. Increases vs. Decreases in Firm Size  
 
In our analysis of the correlation between compensation and changes in firm size, we have 
thus far not distinguished between increases and decreases in firm size. The coefficient of an 
increase in firm size variable captures the average association across both firms that increased 
in size and firms that decreased in size. It is therefore possible that the correlation between 
compensation and changes in size is different among firms that increase in size than among 
firms that decrease in size.  
To explore this issue, we repeat the regressions of sections D and E, but this time we 
decompose the growth in shares outstanding and the growth in sales-per-share into positive 
growth and negative growth. This decomposition permits the coefficient to differ across firms 
that increase in size and firms that decrease in size. We present the results in Table 8. 
Table 8 indicates that, for companies that increased shares outstanding, the coefficient of 
changes in shares outstanding is positive and significant across all regressions. For firms that 
reduced shares outstanding, however, the coefficient of changes in shares outstanding is not 
significant in any of the regressions. This result suggests that the correlation between 
compensation and changes in shares outstanding is driven by firms with CEOs who increased 
firm size. There is an asymmetry in the response of current compensation to changes in firm 
size under the CEO’s management: When firm size increases, there is an increase in 
compensation; but when firm size decreases, there is no decrease in compensation. 
We obtain similar results for the coefficient of sales-per-share. For firms that had a positive 
change in sales-per-share, the coefficient of change in such sales is positive and significant in 
all the level regressions and in three of the change-in-compensation regressions. In contrast, for 
firms that had a negative change in sales-per-share, the coefficient of change in sales-per-share 
is not significant in all of the level regressions and in five out of the six change-in-






3.9. Executive Pay and Dividend Decisions  
 
We have thus far included in our regressions the standard stock return variable, which 
measures total returns to shareholders, including dividends. The literature, seeking to explain 
CEO compensation, uses total stockholder returns because it assumes that shareholders benefit 
from total returns, including their dividend component, and therefore CEOs should be 
rewarded for both the capital gains component and the dividend component of the total return.  
However, given our finding that current compensation is correlated with past changes in 
firm size, it is worth separating the stock return into the capital gain component and the 
dividend component. The part of the total stock return that is in the form of capital gain does 
contribute to increasing the firm’s market capitalization, but the part that is distributed as 
dividend does not contribute to increasing the firm’s market capitalization.  
Having seen that current compensation is correlated with past stock returns, we therefore 
now wish to explore whether compensation is correlated to the same extent with the capital 
gains component and the dividend component of stock returns. We therefore extend our 
analysis by decomposing past stock returns into two components: (i) the return excluding 
dividends (taken from CRSP), and (ii) the return from dividends, which is defined as the total 
return with dividend reinvested (also from CRSP) minus return without dividends. We then re-
run the basic regressions of sections D (where the dependent variable is the level of CEO 
compensation) and of section E (where the dependent variable is the change in CEO 
compensation), replacing the (total) stock return variable with a return excluding dividends 
variable and a dividend return variable. For robustness, we also check whether our results 
extend to two-year intervals and four-year intervals. 
Table 9 presents the coefficients of the return excluding dividends and the dividend return 
in all of these regressions. The results in Table 9 indicate that the coefficient of the return 
excluding dividends variable is positive and significant in all the compensation level 
regressions and in all the change-in-compensation regressions. It is also significant across the 
two-year, three-year, and four-year intervals.  
In contrast, the coefficient of the dividend return is, in general, not positively significant. 
Out of the 34 annual regressions we run, the coefficient of the dividend return is not significant 
in 28 of them, is negative and significant in 3 of them, and is positive and significant in 3 of 
them. Thus, we find no evidence that a CEO’s current compensation is correlated with the 
dividend component of past returns under the CEO in the same way that it is correlated with  19
the undistributed, capital gain component of past returns. This finding is consistent with the 




This paper has investigated empirically the validity of the concern expressed by Jensen 
(1986) and others that executive compensation practices might, overall, provide executives 
with incentives to expand firm size. We have found that increases in a firm’s size during a 
CEO’s service are associated with higher subsequent pay—both relative to CEOs in other 
companies and relative to the compensation the CEO had earlier. Decomposing changes in size 
(as measured by either assets or sales) into changes in size per share and in the number of 
shares outstanding, we find that changes in either component are associated with higher 
subsequent pay for the CEO. We also find that compensation is correlated only with the 
component of past stockholder returns that is not distributed as dividends.  
The association we find between increases in firm size and higher subsequent CEO pay is 
economically meaningful. As emphasized throughout, this association does not indicate that 
compensation practices are suboptimal. But it does indicate that, overall, compensation 
practices provide managers with excessive incentives to expand firm size. The effects of these 
incentives might be mitigated in part or wholly by other factors affecting managers’ decisions. 
But taking these incentives into account is necessary for a full understanding of the decisions 
that public firms make with respect to acquisitions, share issuance, capital-raising, operating 
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The sample consists of firms that have CEO compensation data in the Execucomp database. In each year, we 
consider firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the preceding three years. Financial information is from 
Compustat and CRSP. Compensation in any given year is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, total value of 
restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, 
and other compensation. Market cap is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price at the end 
of the calendar year. Growth in shares outstanding is the number of shares in the end of year t minus the number 
of shares in the end of year t-3 (adjusted for stock splits), divided by the number of shares at the end of year t-3. 
Return variability is the monthly standard deviation of the stock return (with dividends), measured over the 48 
months between year t-4 and year t.. New Economy firms is as defined in Murphy (2003).  
   1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
Median  Compensation  ($K)  2359  2501  3034  3257  3161  3040 
Median  Market  value  ($M)  1829  1475  1671  1517  1453  1130 
Median  Assets  ($M)  1713  1770  2052  1924  1759  1682 
Median  Sales  ($M)  1416  1426  1540  1501  1359  1136 
             
Three-year growth in compensation 
   – Median 
37%  44%  46%  39%  31%  14% 
Three-year stock return 
   – Median 
66%  39%  14%   7%   12%   4% 
Standard deviation of returns 
   – Median 
7%   9%  10%  11%  12%  12% 
             
Three-year growth in shares 
outstanding                    
25%  Quartile  -2%  -3%  -3%  -6%  -4%  -3% 
50% Quartile  2%    2%    2%  1%  2%  3% 
75% Quartile  16%    17%    20%  16%  17%  14% 
             
Three-year growth in sales-per-share             
25% Quartile  1%  0%  0%  6%  -4%    -14% 
50% Quartile  20%  18%  17%  25%  16%  6% 
75% Quartile  31%  31%  34%  39%  29%  14% 
             
Three-year growth in assets-per-
share             
25%  Quartile  0%  1%  6%  7%  0%  -8% 
50% Quartile  19%    22%    24%  25%  22%  15% 
75% Quartile 
 
46%  50%  57%  61%  54%  39% 
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TABLE 2: PAY AND FIRM VARIABLES 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation on firm characteristics. The sample consists of firms that 
have CEO compensation data in the Execucomp database. In each year, we consider firms whose CEOs were not 
replaced in the preceding three years. The dependent variable is the log of CEO compensation. Compensation in 
any given year is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock 
options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. Financial 
information is from Compustat and CRSP. Market cap is the log of the market value of equity at the end of the 
calendar year, where the market value of equity is the price at the end of the calendar year, multiplied by the 
shares outstanding at the end of the calendar year. Sales is the log of the sales (in $millions).  Industry-adjusted Q 
is the log of the firm’s Tobin’s Q in the end of the year minus the log of the median Q in the industry that the firm 
belongs to. Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of the equity plus the book value of assets, minus the book 
value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. Return variability is the monthly standard deviation of the 
stock return, measured over the last 48 months. New Economy firm is as defined in Murphy (2003). Industry 
dummies are as defined in Fama and French (1997). All variables are adjusted for inflation and are in 2002 
dollars. The variables in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The symbols 
*,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
  1997   1998 1999 2000 2001   2002 
Intercept 3.66  ***  5.12***  3.70***  3.90***  3.29 ***  3.24*** 
  (0.48) (0.37) (0.47) (0.43) (0.47)    (0.60)
Market cap  0.39 ***  0.31***  0.30***  0.21***  0.34 ***  0.33*** 
  (0.07)   (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)   (0.05) 
Sales 0.12  *  0.15***  0.29***  0.34***  0.23 ***  0.22*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)    (0.05)
Industry-adjusted Q  -0.08   -0.04  0.10  0.21**  0.00   -0.12 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)    (0.11)
Return variability  2.93 **  1.91***  5.19***  5.76***  5.09 ***  3.17*** 
  (1.27) (0.50) (0.96) (0.83) (0.62)    (0.66)
New-economy dummy  0.42 **  0.24  0.48**  0.55***  0.57 ***  0.56*** 
  (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15)    (0.16)
Industry dummies  +    +   +   +   +    +  
Observations 531    509   497   482   492    545  
Adjusted R
2 54%    52%   63%   63%   65%    51%  
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TABLE 3:  PAY AND PAST CHANGES IN FIRM SIZE 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation on changes in firm characteristics. The sample consists 
of firms that have CEO compensation data in the Execucomp database. In each year, we consider firms whose 
CEOs were not replaced in the preceding three years. The dependent variable is log of CEO compensation. 
Compensation in any given year is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total 
value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. 
Financial information is from Compustat and CRSP. Market cap growth is market cap in year (t) minus market 
cap in year (t-3). Sales growth is sales in year (t) minus sales in year (t-3). The rest of the variables are as defined 
in Table 2. All variables are adjusted for inflation and are in 2002 dollars. The variables in parentheses are the 
estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The symbols *,**,***  represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The intercept coefficient is omitted from the table.  
 
 
      1997   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
Changes in firm variables  
during the preceding 
 three years            
                               




***  0.37 
***  0.37
*** 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)   (0.07) 
Sales growth (t-3 to t)  0.09  0.34***  0.38***  0.28***  0.24 ***  0.13 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)   (0.10) 
Initial firm variables              
Market cap (t-3)  0.36***  0.33***  0.32***  0.20***  0.32 ***  0.32*** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) 
Sales (t-3)  0.13**  0.14**  0.27***  0.36***  0.24 ***  0.24*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.05) 
Control variables              
Industry-adjusted Q  -0.15  -0.12  0.09  0.24**  0.00   -0.10 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)   (0.11) 
Return variability  2.59**  1.71***  5.05***  6.06***  5.11 ***  3.59*** 
  (1.31) (0.50) (0.98) (0.87) (0.65)   (0.73) 
New-economy dummy  0.41**  0.24 0.44**  0.55***  0.56 ***  0.54*** 
  (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15)   (0.17)
Industry dummies  +    +    +   +   +      +  
Observations 527  507   495  482   488   543  
Adjusted R
2 54%  53%   63%  63%   65%   51%   26
TABLE 4: PAY AND PAST CHANGES IN SHARES OUTSTANDING  
AND SALES PER SHARE 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation on corporate performance and expansion. The sample 
consists of firms that have CEO compensation data in the Execucomp database. In each year, we consider firms 
whose CEOs were not replaced in the preceding three years. Financial information is from Compustat and CRSP. 
The dependent variable is log compensation in year t. Compensation in any given year is defined as the sum of 
salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), 
long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation.  Stock return is the log of the gross stock return (including 
dividends, net of inflation) between the end of year t-3 and the end of year t. Growth in sales per share is the 
difference between the log of sales per share in year t and the log of sales per share in year t-3. The rest of the 
variables are as defined in Table 2. The variables in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the 
coefficients. The symbols *,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
The intercept coefficient is omitted from the table. 
     1997 1998 1999 2000 2001    2002 
Changes in firm variables during  
 the preceding three years                
                     
Stock return  (t-3 to t)  0.48***  0.23**  0.21***  0.25***  0.34 ***  0.31*** 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)   (0.07)
Growth in shares outstanding  0.67***  0.97***  0.73***  0.71***  0.59 ***  0.56*** 
(t-3 to t)  (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)  (0.14)   (0.17)
Growth in sales per share  0.16  0.33***  0.43***  0.22***  0.32 ***  0.19* 
(t-3 to t)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)  (0.08)   (0.10) 
Initial firm variables              
Market cap (t-3)  0.32***  0.27***  0.32***  0.24***  0.31 ***  0.28*** 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05)   (0.05)
Sales (t-3)  0.18***  0.19***  0.28***  0.33***  0.26 ***  0.27*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.05)   (0.05)
Control variables              
Industry-adjusted Q  -0.08  0.01  0.12  0.17  0.01   -0.04 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)  (0.11)   (0.12)
Return variability  3.16**  1.63***  4.73***  5.77***  5.20 ***  3.50*** 
  (1.35) (0.52) (1.00) (0.93)  (0.68)   (0.78)
New-economy dummy  0.45**  0.31  0.46**  0.61***  0.58 ***  0.58*** 
  (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)  (0.15)   (0.17)
Industry dummies  +    +    +   +   +    +  
Observations 519 506  494  474  483    539
Adjusted R
2 53%  53%  64%  64%  64%    50% 
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TABLE 5: CHANGES IN COMPENSATION LEVELS 
The table shows regression results of changes in CEO compensation on firm performance and growth in size.  The 
sample consists of firms that have CEO compensation data in the Execucomp database and whose CEO served in 
this position in the preceding three years. Financial information is from Compustat and CRSP. The dependent 
variable is the difference between log CEO compensation in year t and log of CEO compensation in year t-3. 
Compensation in any given year is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, total value of restricted stock granted, total 
value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and other compensation. 
Growth in Q is the difference between industry-adjusted Q in year t and industry-adjusted Q in year t-3. Growth in 
return variability is the difference between return variability in year t and return variability in year t-3. Stock 
return is the log of the gross stock return (including dividends, net of inflation) between the end of year t-3 and the 
end of year t. Growth in sales per share is the difference between the log of sales per share in year t and the log of 
sales per share in year t-3. The rest of the variables are as defined in Table 2.  The variables in parentheses are the 
estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The symbols *,**,***  represent statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The intercept coefficient is omitted from the table. 
 
 
  1997 1998  1999  2000 2001   2002 
Changes in firm variables  
during  the preceding 
 three years                   
                              




***  0.35 
***  0.37
*** 
  (0.11) (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.07) (0.08)   (0.07) 
0.65***  0.47***  0.37***  0.69***  0.41***  0.12  Growth in shares outstanding 
(t-3 to t)  (0.15)  (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)
-0.08  0.26***  0.37***  0.23***  0.24 ***  0.10  Growth in sales-per-share 
(t-3 to t)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07)  (0.08)    (0.09) 
Initial firm variables             
Market cap (t-3)  0.04  -0.13**  -0.09  -0.11*  -0.07   -0.03 
  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06)   (0.05) 
Sales (t-3)  0.03  0.13**  0.19***  0.15***  0.10 *  0.02 
  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05)   (0.05) 
Control variables              
Industry-adjusted Q (t-3)  -0.13  0.28**  0.15  0.18  0.19 *  -0.09 
  (0.12) (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11) (0.11)   (0.11) 
Growth in Q  -0.24  0.12  0.18  0.33**  -0.09   -0.25* 
(t-3 to t)  (0.18) (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13) (0.15)   (0.14) 
Return variability (t-3)  -0.27  0.36  0.36  2.26*  1.28   -0.04 
  (0.92) (1.02)  (1.25)  (1.18) (0.95)   (0.94) 
0.13 0.19 0.12 0.42***  0.29*  0.15    Growth in return variability 
(t-3 to t)  (0.15) (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) 
New-economy dummy  -0.07  0.29*  0.29*  0.30*  0.23   -0.05 
  (0.18) (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18) (0.15)   (0.15)
Industry dummies   +   +   +   +   +      +  
Observations   518       506   491       474   482        538  
Adjusted R
2  21% 18%  21%  31% 24%   16% 
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TABLE 6: TWO-YEAR AND FOUR-YEAR INTERVALS 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation (Table 4) and changes in CEO compensation regressions 
(Table 5), where the performance and growth variables are measured on two-year and four-year intervals. Only 
the coefficients of interest appear in the table. The sample consists of firms that have CEO compensation data in 
the Execucomp database. In panel A, only firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the preceding two years are 
considered. In panel B, we consider firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the preceding four years. The 
variables in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The symbols *,**,***  represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
PANEL A: TWO-YEAR INTERVAL 
      1997   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
Compensation level regressions    
  
Growth in shares outstanding   0.92***  0.87***  0.53***  0.70***  0.53 ***  0.45** 
(t-2 to t)  (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17)    (0.21)
Growth in sales-per-share  0.09  0.43***  0.27***  0.25***  0.25 ***  0.30*** 
(t-2 to t)  (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09)   (0.10)
Change-in-compensation regressions                       
Growth in shares outstanding   0.46***  0.28**  0.45***  0.51***  0.22   0.03 
(t-2 to t)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)    (0.19) 
Growth in sales-per-share  0.06  0.26***  0.23***  0.18**  0.08   0.08 
 (t-2 to t)  (0.10)    (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.08)      (0.09)  
 
PANEL B: FOUR-YEAR INTERVAL 
   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002   
Compensation level regressions 
    
Growth in shares outstanding  0.79***  0.87***  0.67***  0.57 ***  0.71 *** 
(t-4 to t)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)   (0.15)   
Growth in sales-per-share  0.29***  0.45***  0.51***  0.24 ***  0.20 ** 
(t-4 to t)  (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)   (0.10) 





Growth in shares outstanding  0.70***  0.59***  0.32**  0.36 **  0.43 *** 
(t-4 to t)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)   (0.15)   
Growth in sales-per-share  0.19*  0.46***  0.45***  0.25 ***  0.15  
 (t-4 to t)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)      (0.11)     
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TABLE 7: PAY AND CHANGES IN ASSETS PER SHARE 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation (Table 4) and changes in CEO compensation regressions 
(Table 5), where instead of growth in sales-per-share and sales coefficients, we use the growth in asset-per-share 
and asset coefficients. The performance and growth variables are measured over two-year, three-year, and four-
year intervals. Only the coefficients of interest appear in the table. The sample consists of firms that have CEO 
compensation data in the Execucomp database. In panel A, only firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the 
preceding two years are considered. In panel B, we consider firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the 
preceding three years. In panel C, we consider firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the preceding four years. 
The variables in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The symbols *,**,***  
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
PANEL A: TWO-YEAR INTERVAL 
   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
Compensation level regressions      
Growth in shares outstanding  0.87***  0.80***  0.49***  0.70***  0.50 ***  0.36* 
(t-2 to t)  (0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)  (0.17)   (0.21) 
Growth in assets-per-share  0.13  0.49***  0.55***  0.46***  0.52 ***  0.31***
(t-2 to t)  (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.11)   (0.12)
Change-in-compensation regressions             
Growth in shares outstanding  0.40**  0.22*  0.40***  0.51***  0.21   0.02 
(t-2 to t)  (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)  (0.16)   (0.19)
Growth in assets-per-share  -0.05  0.26**  0.53***  0.37***  0.24 **  0.04 
(t-2 to t)  (0.15)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)     (0.12)     (0.12)  
PANEL B: THREE-YEAR INTERVAL 
   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
Compensation level regressions                  
Growth in shares outstanding  0.64***  0.88***  0.67***  0.67***  0.53 ***  0.52*** 
(t-3 to t)  (0.17) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15)  (0.14)   (0.17)
Growth in assets-per-share  0.16  0.37***  0.53***  0.55***  0.49 ***  0.27** 
(t-3 to t)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.10)   (0.11)
Change-in-compensation regressions             
Growth in shares outstanding  0.64***  0.39***  0.32***  0.67***  0.40 ***  0.13 
(t-3 to t)  (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.14)  (0.13)   (0.15)
Growth in assets-per-share  -0.16  0.26**  0.49***  0.50***  0.51 ***  0.20* 
(t-3 to t)  (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)  (0.11)   (0.10)
PANEL C: FOUR-YEAR INTERVAL 
   1997  1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
Compensation level regressions          
Growth in shares outstanding  0.74***  0.72***  0.64***  0.53 ***  0.65*** 
(t-4 to t)  (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)   (0.15) 
Growth in assets-per-share  0.19  0.45***  0.57***  0.50 ***  0.11 
(t-4 to t)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)   (0.10)
Change-in-compensation regressions            
Growth in shares outstanding  0.66***  0.45***  0.32**  0.35 **  0.36** 
(t-4 to t)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.16)   (0.15)
Growth in assets-per-share  0.07 0.36***  0.59***  0.44 ***  0.17
(t-4 to t)    (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.15)      (0.12)   30
TABLE 8: POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE CHANGES IN FIRM SIZE 
 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation (Table 4) and changes in CEO compensation regressions 
(Table 5), where we decompose the growth in shares outstanding and the growth in sales-per-share into negative 
and positive growth. The performance and growth variables are measured over two-year, three-year, and four-year 
intervals. Only the coefficients of interest appear in the table. The sample consists of firms that have CEO 
compensation data in the Execucomp database. Only firms whose CEOs were not replaced in the preceding three 
years are considered. The variables in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The 




Variable  1997   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
 
Compensation level regressions 
                  
0.89***  1.07***  0.71***  0.89***  0.66 ***  0.59*** Positive changes in 
shares outstanding (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17)  (0.16)   (0.19) 
-1.15*  0.20  0.32  -0.11 -0.06  0.14  Negative changes in 
shares outstanding (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.66) (0.53) (0.44) (0.41) (0.52) (0.66) 
0.22*  0.33**  0.64***  0.45***  0.64 ***  0.26*  Positive changes in 
sales-per-share (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)   (0.16) 
-0.04  0.34  0.04  0.04  0.09   0.10  Negative changes in 
sales-per-share (t-3 to t) 
 














0.70***  0.49***  0.39***  0.71***  0.49 ***  0.08  Positive changes in 
shares outstanding (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)  (0.15)   (0.18) 
0.15  0.78  0.13  0.61  -0.32   0.27  Negative changes in 
shares outstanding (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.59) (0.47) (0.42) (0.39)  (0.51)   (0.60)
-0.04  0.08  0.42***  0.41***  0.60 ***  0.17  Positive changes in 
sales-per-share (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)  (0.13)   (0.15) 
-0.22  0.62***  0.27  0.09  -0.03   0.02  Negative changes in 
sales- per-share (t-3 to t) 
 
(0.22)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.10)     (0.11)      (0.16)   31
TABLE 9: DIVIDEND VS. CAPITAL GAIN COMPONENTNS OF STOCK RETURNS 
 
The table shows regression results of CEO compensation (Table 4) and changes in CEO compensation regressions 
(Table 5), where the return is decomposed into return without dividend and dividend return. The performance and 
growth variables are measured over two-year, three-year, and four-year intervals. Only the coefficients of interest 
appear in the table. The variables in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the coefficients. The 
symbols *,**,***  represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Variable  1997   1998   1999   2000   2001    2002  
TWO-YEAR INTERVAL       
Compensation level regressions      
Return without dividends  0.48***  0.24***  0.26***  0.23***  0.32 ***  0.27***
(t-2 to t)  (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05)  (0.07)   (0.07)
Dividend return  -0.18  -4.00   -2.23*  -1.40  -3.79 ***  -4.65***
(t-2 to t)  (0.82) (1.30) (1.31) (1.08)  (1.07)   (1.21)
Change-in-compensation regressions              
Return without dividends  0.41***  0.36***  0.22***  0.40***  0.45 ***  0.30***
(t-2 to t)  (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.08)   (0.07)
Dividend return  1.27*  1.80  -0.67  1.25  -0.10   -0.35 
(t-2 to t)  (0.72) (1.29) (1.31) (1.06)  (1.05)   (1.15)
              
THREE-YEAR INTERVAL              
Compensation level regressions              
Return without dividends  0.48***  0.23***  0.20***  0.24***  0.34 ***  0.34***
(t-3 to t)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)   (0.07)
Dividend return  0.16  -1.10  -1.75*  -0.50  -0.63   -3.23***
(t-3 to t)  (1.03) (0.74) (1.05) (0.97)  (0.92)   (0.85)
Change-in-compensation regressions              
Return without dividends  0.59***  0.28***  0.24***  0.20***  0.35 ***  0.37***
(t-3 to t)  (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.08)   (0.07)
Dividend return  1.99**  0.21  -0.31  -0.22  0.35 ***  -0.50 
(t-3 to t)  (0.90) (0.68) (1.00) (0.92)  (0.08)   (0.83) 
              
FOUR-YEAR INTERVAL            
Compensation level regressions          
Return without dividends  0.39***  0.18**  0.24***  0.41 ***  0.42***
(t-4 to t)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)  (0.09)   (0.07) 
Dividend return  -1.13  0.09  0.43  0.67   -1.13 
(t-4 to t)  (0.86) (0.72) (0.93)  (0.92)   (0.84) 
Change-in-compensation regressions            
Return without dividends  0.46***  0.14*  0.22***  0.48 ***  0.41***
(t-4 to t)  (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.11)   (0.08) 
Dividend return  0.83 0.61 0.01   0.77    1.04
(t-4 to t)  (0.85)  (0.64)  (0.91)     (1.03)    (0.88)  